^r.  V anderlip’s 
Message 


An  Address  by- 


Frank  A.  Vanderlip 

Before  the  Members  of  the 
San  Francisco  Commercial  Club 
and 

San  Francisco  Chamber  of  Commerce 


June  2, 1920 


Compliments  of 

D.  S.  Richardson 

2541  Hilgard  Avenue 
Berkeley,  Cal. 


FRANK  ARTHUR  VANDERLIP 


[From  Who’s  Who  In  America] 

Frank  Arthur  Vanderlip  born  at  Aurora, 
111.,  November  17,  1864;  student  of  University 
of  Illinois  and  University  of  Chicago;  Hon- 
orary M.  A.  of  Illinois,  1905 ; LL.  D.,  Colgate 
University,  1911 ; reporter,  1889,  later  finan- 
cial editor  of  Chicago  Tribune;  associate  edi- 
tor Chicago  Economist,  1894-7. 

Private  secretary  to  Secretary  of  the  Treas- 
ury Lyman  Judson  Gage,  March  to  June, 
1897 ; Assistant  Secretary  of  the  Treasury, 
1897-1901 ; vice  president,  1901-1909,  president 
since  January,  1919,  National  City  Bank,  New 
York. 

Chairman  board  of  directors  American 
International  Corporation;  director  HaskeU 
and  Baker,  Midvale  Steel  and  Ordnance  Com- 
pany, Union  Pacific  Eailroad,  Oregon  Short 
Line  Eailroad  Company,  McIntosh  and  Sey- 
mour Corporation,  Farmers’  Loan  and  Trust 
Company  of  New  York,  Oregon- Washington 
Eailroad  and  Navigation  Company,  Peekskill 
Lighting  and  Eailroad  Company,  New  York 
Edison  Company,  United  States  Eealty  and 
Improvement  Company. 

Trustee  Consolidated  Gas  Company,  North- 
ern Westchester  Lighting  Company,  Mercan- 
tile Safe  Deposit  Company;  trustee  Carnegie 
Foundation,  New  York  University;  president 
New  York  Clearing  House  Association. 

Visited  Europe  to  study  financial  and  indus- 
trial conditions,  1901;  delegate  to  Interna- 
tional Conference  on  Commerce  and  Industry, 
Ostend,  Belgium,  1902. 

Clubs : Economic,  Metropolitan,  Bankers  of 
America,  City,  Union  League  (New  York) ; 
Cosmos  (Washington,  D.  C.) ; Press,  Commer- 
cial, Union  League  (Chicago) ; Sleepy  HoUow 
Country  of  Scarborough  (pres.) ; India  House 
(New  York). 

Author:  Chicago  Street  Eailways;  The 
American  Commercial  Invasion  of  Europe; 
Business  and  Education,  1907 ; Political  Prob- 
lems of  Europe;  What  Happened  to  Europe; 
also  important  financial  and  economic  papers. 

Home : Scarborough-on-Hudson 

Office : 111  Broadway,  New  York. 

[2] 


J 


Mr.  Vanderlip^s  Message 


Mr.  President  and  Gentlemen:  I went  to 
Japan  in  a wholly  unofi&cial  capacity.  I re- 
ceived an  invitation  from  an  organization  in 
J apan  called  ‘ ‘ The  Welcome  Association.  ’ ’ It 
embraced  one  hundred  of  the  leading  citizens 
of  Japan — ^leading  in  business,  in  political  life, 
in  the  intellectual  life  of  the  nation.  They 
invited  me  to  pick  out  a party  of  ten  men,  to 
come  to  Japan  with  their  wives  and  have  a 
frank,  unofficial  discussion  of  the  points  of 
difference  between  the  two  nations.  It  seemed 
to  be  an  important  invitation — a promising 
opportunity  to  learn  something.  I approached 
it  wholly  as  a student  of  the  Par  Eastern 
question,  and  a student  in  the  primary  depart- 
ment, because  my  attention  has  been  rather 
fixed  on  the  other  side  of  the  world,  and  while 
I have  been  connected  with  some  large  busi- 
ness enterprises  in  the  Orient,  I have  not  pre- 
tended to  understand  very  much  of  the 
Oriental  question,  or  to  know  much  of  the 
Japanese  problem. 

We  met  in  Tokyo,  a party  of  ten  Americans, 
representing  nothing  and  having  no  official 
standing  whatever — representing  no  Chambers 
of  Commerce  or  similar  organizations — simply 
nine  other  men  I picked  out  because  I thought 
they  were  open-minded,  able  American  citi- 
zens. And  we  met  with  a similar  and  consid- 
erably larger  group  of  Japanese.  The  first 
word  was,  “Put  diplomacy  aside — let  us  dis- 
cuss with  frankness  and  candor  the  questions 
involved  between  these  two  nations,”  And 
then  we  began  to  make  a stateinent  of  what 
the  problems  were,  and,  as  we  were  the  guests 
and  were  not  experts — we  were  simply  stu- 
dents— we  said  to  those  gentlemen,  “Name  the 
problems.”  The  first  problem  they  named 
was  one  that  was  deep  in  their  hearts.  And 
they  named  it  with  the  greatest  sincerity  and 
the  greatest  gravity, — ^the  Japanese  question 
in  California.  Then  I was  called  on  to  state 


what  we  wanted  to  discuss,  and  I said  there  was 
a wider  question,  the  question  of  a growing 
suspicion  in  the  minds  of  Americans  not  at  all 
confined  to  California,  but  in  the  minds  of  all 
Americans,  as  to  the  purposes  and  aims  and 
aspirations  of  the  Japanese  nation.  We  had 
been  shocked  by  what  had  occurred  in  Korea. 
That  we  had  suspicions  as  to  Shantung;  as  to 
just  what  were  the  aims  of  Japan  in  that  prov- 
ince of  China,  and  we  looked  with  interest  on 
the  situation  in  Mongolia  and  Manchuria,  and 
with  rather  intent  interest  on  the  position  of 
Japan  in  Siberia.  We  thought  all  of  those 
questions  ought  to  be  freely  and  frankly  dis- 
cussed. That  was  agreed  to.  Then  they  asked 
that  we  go  further;  that  we  discuss  the  idea 
of  cooperation  of  American  and  Japanese 
capital  in  the  industrial  development  of  China, 
and  that  we  also  discuss  the  question  of  com- 
munication between  America  and  Japan— that 
is,  of  better  cable  facilities.  There  was  the 
general  program. 

We  spent  a week  meeting  every  morning  at 
9 :30  and  proceeding  in  parliamentary  order 
with  Japanese  and  American  secretaries  and 
stenographers.  Baron  Shibusawa  was  made 
the  honorary  chairman.  Viscount  Kaneko  and 
myself  were  the  presidents  of  the  Conference. 
Now,  remember,  it  was  wholly  unofficial.  But 
I will  say  it  assumed  something  more  than 
just  an  unofficial  conference  of  citizens,  be- 
cause the  government  at  once  began  to  show  a 
decided  interest,  a sympathetic  interest.  The 
government  officials  entertained  us.  The 
Premier  gave  us  a garden  party,  the  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs  a dinner.  We  met  all  the 
government  officials  and  then  it  went  further. 
The  elder  statesmen — there  are  only  two  left 
— Prince  Yamagata  and  Marquis  Matsukata, 
each  asked  for  an  interview.  The  Imperial 
household  twice  entertained  us.  The  Gov- 
ernors of  the  Provinces,  the  miunicipalities  of 
Tokyo,  Osaka,  Kyoto  and  Nara  all  entertained 
us  in  an  exceedingly  fine  and  dignified  way. 
So  that  I feel  that  we  have  had,  although  a 

[4] 


quite  unofficial  visit,  a very  unusual  oppor- 
tunity to  gauge  the  sentiment  of  Japan — the 
sentiments  of  the  business  leaders,  men  high 
in  polities,  even  those  far  back  of  the  govern- 
ment, hut  powerful  in  their  influence,  and  we 
had,  too,  a pretty  close  contact  in  some  in- 
stances with  the  common  people  themselves. 

Let  me  make  a very  hasty  resume  of  this 
conference.  The  California  question  is  not  a 
question  of  immigration  to  California.  That 
was  one  of  the  flrst  things  I learned.  It  is  a 
question  of  the  treatment  of  the  Japanese  in 
California.  But,  even  deeper  than  that,  much 
deeper  than  that,  I think,  is  the  method  of  ap- 
proach to  those  questions.  The  seriousness  of 
unlimited  Oriental  immigration  into  our  social 
structure  here  is  fully  appreciated  by  the 
Japanese.  Nowhere  did  I find  a demand  for 
any  backward  step  in  our  attitude  of  exclu- 
sion. I did  find  objections  to  treatment  that 
differentiated  against  the  Japanese  who  are 
here — treatment  that  infers  that  they  are  an 
inferior  people  and  that  they  should  not  have 
the  rights  and  privileges  of  other  aliens.  But 
deeper  than  that,  as  I said,  was  the  resentment 
— and  there  was  a grave  resentment — over  the 
tone,  the  language,  the  nature  of  our  approach 
to  the  questions  and  also  the  fact  that  there 
was  no  approach  that  reached  to  the  Japanese 
Government ; that  our  Federal  authorities 
seemed  to  ignore  the  whole  subject,  to  leave  it 
in  the  hands,  if  you  will  excuse  plain  speaking, 
of  politiciansj  of  newspapers,  not  always 
moved  by  the  highest  motives,  inviting  any- 
body with  deep  racial  prejudices  to  make  dis- 
courteous remarks  in  regard  to  the  situation. 

When  I went  to  Japan,  when  I left  here,  I 
think  I was  a little  more  than  open-minded. 

I think  I failed  to  see.  as  I see  today  the 
seriousness  of  any  opening  of  the  door  to  fur- 
ther Ja|)anese  immigration.  I left  Japan  with 
a- very  much  higher  opinion  of- the  Japanese 
than  I had  when- 1 landed  there,  but  with  a 
clearer  opinion  in  my  mind  that  we  ought  hot 
to  permit  further  immigration.  Biit  they  take 


the  attitude  that  our  stand  in  that  respect  is 
all  right — they  were  sorry,  particularly  sorry 
in  so  far  as  it  placed  them  in  a position  of  in- 
feriority, hut  they  said  that  they  had  met  that 
with  a gentlemen’s  agreement  and  that  they 
had  scrupulously  kept  that  gentlemen ’s  agree- 
ment. Now,  I know  in  your  mind  there  is 
doubt  that  they  have  scrupulously  kept  that 
agreement.  I find  in  some  minds  there  is  a 
doubt  that  we,  in  the  United  States,  have  scru- 
pulously kept  it,  or  seen  to  it  that  it  is  kept 
scrupulously.  I am  told  here  that,  perhaps, 
any  criticism  might  first  fall  upon  our  own 
authorities,  if  there  has  been  any  violation  of 
that  agreement. 

They  said  then,  further,  that  they  saw  the 
force  of  the  objection  that  was  made  to  the 
so-called  picture  brides,  and  that  they  had  met 
that  and  would  scrupulously  keep  that  agree- 
ment as  soon  as  the  few  who  still  had  been  con- 
tracted for  had  arrived  here. 

So  the  question  of  additional  immigration 
or  the  question  of  bringing  in  picture  brides 
was  disposed  of  so  far  as  they  were  concerned. 
They  said  that  they  believed  they  could  dis- 
pose of  every  question,  if  they  were  ap- 
proached with  courtesy  and  sympathy  and 
some  understanding  of  their  own  situation. 
That  is  where  this  Japanese-California  ques- 
tion rests  in  my  mind;  that  if  you  will  ap- 
proach it,  not  in  the  language  of  the  political 
arena,  not  with  emphasis  on  racial  prejudices, 
but  if  you  approach  it  through  the  Federal 
Government,  which  is  the  only  approach  that 
can  be  made  to  the  Japanese  Government, 
that  everything  you  seek  to  accomplish  — 
every  reasonable  request  that  you  could  make 
could  be  adjusted  and  the  whole  situation  left 
in  a position  of  good  feeling.  But  if  there  is 
approach  at  all,  if  you  merely  make  it  a foot- 
ball of  politics  and  prejudice,  you  have  got  a 
larger  question  than  the  California  question. 
You  have  not  only  a national  question  but  an 
international  question.  Important  as  your 
relation  to  the  Japanese  question  is,  there  are 
[6] 


other  things  that  in  the  very  brief  time  I have 
I think  I ought  to  turn  to. 

What  is  in  a broad  sense  the  Japanese  prob- 
lem? This  question  of  immigration  is  one  of 
the  phases  of  it.  But  it  is  also  one  of  the  least 
phases  of  it.  I got  a little  glimpse  of  this 
great  Far  Eastern  world,  of  the  situation  that 
a third  of  the  population  of  the  world  is  in; 
of  the  background  of  the  Japanese  question. 
Let  me  say  a word  about  that.  There  are 
400,000,000  people  in  China  without  a govern- 
ment, literally.  There  is  a semblance  of  a 
Kepublic  imposed  upon  a people  who  have  no 
experience  whatever  in  political  life.  A people 
who  are  95  per  cent  illiterate ; who  have  more 
than  20  different  languages,  so  that  one  prov- 
ince can  not  understand  another;  who  lack 
communications;  who  lack  all  the  means  of 
developing  a democratic  government.  There 
has  been  a semblance  of  a government  elected 
in  some  sort  of  a way,  but  in  a way  that  never 
entered  the  comprehension  of  probably  90  per 
cent  of  the  population.  It  has  represented 
nothing;  it  has  been  corrupt;  it  has  been  in- 
efficient; it  has  lacked  courage  and  has  been 
without  any  real  national  political  feeling  or 
backing,  and  it  has  no  standing  or  influence. 

There  are  provinces  in  China  today  domi- 
nated by  bandits,  and  the  Government  instead 
of  reaching  out  and  disciplining  or  hanging 
some  of  those  bandit  leaders  has  made  generals 
or  governors  of  them.  The  situation  is  not 
quite  so  hopeless  as  that  would  indicate  be- 
cause there  is  in  China  the  germ  of  a national 
political  life — the  so-called  student  movement. 
It  is  important,  it  is  patriotic,  too  patriotic  in 
some  senses  because  it  is  dominated  by  the 
greatest  racial  prejudices,  but  it  is  a hopeful 
element  that  in  time  may  work  out  a govern- 
ment for  that  vast  horde  of  people.  And 
China  is  next  door  to  Japan, — this  vast  nation 
without  any  central  government  worthy  of  the 
name. 

In  Manchuria  and  Mongolia  the  situation  is 
much  the  same.  In  Siberia,  that  vast  tract 

[7] 


from  the  Pacific  to  Lake  Baikal,  the  greatest 
white  man’s  country  left  in  the  world,  there 
is  complete  political  disintegration.  There  is 
no  central  political  authority.  There  is  no 
government.  On  the  western  border  there  is 
an  invasion  of  Bolshevik  ideas,  of  crazy  eco- 
nomic theories,  but  the  Government  has  disap- 
peared; the  means  of  commerce  have  disap- 
peared. There  is  no  adequate  transportation. 
There  is  no  effective  currency.  The  currency 
has  become  valueless.  There  is  no  banking. 
The  people  are  sinking  back  into  a primitive 
state  without  the  means  of  exchange  and  with- 
out any  real  political  life. 

There  is  the  background  of  the  Japanese 
questions.  We  find  that  they  have  gone  into 
China  and  into  Shantung.  Shantung  is  a very 
great  province  with  30,000,000  people,  lying 
close  to  Japan.  The  peninsula  reaches  out 
into  the  Pacific  and  is  the  easternmost  part  of 
China.  The  Germans  had  been  granted  con- 
cessions in  Shantung;  the  concession  of  20 
square  miles  where  they  had  sovereignty,  and 
the  ownership  of  a railroad  which  they  had 
erected  and  controlled.  When  Japan  was 
asked  to  enter  the  war,  which  she  promptly 
did,  the  first  request  was  that  the  stronghold 
of  Germany  in  the  Pacific  should  be  captured. 
It  was  fortified  by  heavy  guns  and  great  ships, 
and  the  harbor  was  laid  with  submarine  mines. 
Japan  therefore  asked  to  approach  it  from  the 
rear,  and  obtained  from  China,  a neutral  na- 
tion at  that  time,  the  right  to  march  her 
troops  150  miles  across  the  peninsula.  She 
did  that ; she  did  not  keep  strictly  within  the 
lines  of  the  agreement;  the  weather  was  bad, 
the  roads  were  bad  and  she  went  outside  of 
the  direct  route  with  some  of  her  soldiers.  She 
invested  Eaauchow  and  captured  it,  and  it  has 
since  been  under  the  military  domination  of 
Japan.  She  took  possession  of  the  railroad 
and  has  policed  it  with  Japanese  troops,  and  I 
believed  has  used  it  in  a way  preferential  to 
Japanese.  She  has  done  things  that  are  sub- 
ject to  criticism,  and  the  people  at  home  are 
[8] 


frank  in  criticism  of  the  military  side  of  the 
Government. 

Japan  has  promised  to  return  all  sover- 
eignty to  China.  On  the  24:th  of  last  January 
she  invited  China  to  a conference  in  regard  to 
the  return  of  sovereignty  and  to  discuss  the 
commercial  advantages  she  had  acquired  from 
Germany  at  the  Peace  Conference  with  the 
acquiescence  of  China  and  Germany.  No  such 
conference  has  been  or  can  be  had  because  the 
Chinese  Government  is  too  weak  to  engage  in 
such  a conference  and  there  the  Shantung 
question  stands.  There  is  a good  deal  to 
criticize  in  what  Japan  has  done.  She  has 
been  harsh  in  her  military  administration. 
She  has  levied  some  taxes  that  ought  not  to 
have  been  levied.  She  has  treated  the  rail- 
ways so  that  they  are  operated  preferentially 
for  Japan’s  business.  Still  she  has  promised 
and  says  she  stands  ready  to  restore  full  sov- 
ereignty to  China  if  only  there  can  be  a gov- 
ernment strong  enough  to  accept  it  from  her 
hands. 

Now,  Korea.  There  have  been  some  terrible 
things  in  Korea.  That  the  military  adminis- 
tration of  the  Japanese  has  been  harsh  and 
brutal,  they  admit.  Japan  stands  abashed  at 
the  record  she  has  made.  When  the  matter 
finally  came  forcibly  to  her  attention,  how- 
ever, she  took  the  most  important  political 
action  that  could  be  taken  in  Japan;  an  Im- 
perial rescript  was  issued  in  regard  to  the 
situation.  The  Government  changed  from  a 
military  to  a civil  government  a year  ago  and 
since  that  time  the  Japanese  believe  there  is 
little  to  criticize  in  the  administration  of 
Korea. 

Japan  entered  Siberia  at  the  request  of  the 
Allies  and  accompanied  by  the  troops  of  the 
Allies.  The  Allies’  purposes  did  not  appear  to 
be  clear  in  their  own  minds ; their  policy  vacil- 
lated. Finally  we  withdrew  our  troops  with- 
out'notification.  Even  our  own  Ambassador 
did  not  know  of  it  until  he  heard  of  it  through 
the  War  Office  of  Japan.  There  was  a terri- 

[ 9 ] ■ • 


tory  absolutely  without  government,  with  no 
army  to  maintain  law  and  order.  The  Japa- 
nese had  increased  their  troops  to  a larger 
proportion  than  they  should  have  had,  based 
on  the  number  of  Allied  troops.  She  has  about 

40.000  troops  in  Siberia,  just  a handful  in  that 
great  territory,  where  there  should  be  several 
hundred  thousand  properly  to  police  it.  She 
says  she  has  no  thought  or  inclination  or 
means  to  keep  them  there  and  she  intends  to 
withdraw  the  troops  as  fast  as  she  can. 

But  there  is  a deeper  Japanese  problem 
than  any  of  these  things,  one  that  every  man 
ought  to  have  clearly  in  his  mind,  and  I think 
sympathetically  in  his  mind.  We  criticize 
Japan.  There  is  a condition  and  not  a theory 
in  this  problem.  The  condition  is  57,000,000 
people  on  a group  of  islands  not  as  large  as  the 
State  of  California,  17  per  cent  of  which  is 
arable,  a population  which  is  increasing  at  the 
rate  of  600,000  to  700,000  annually,  grown 
now  so  large  that  they  can  not  be  maintained 
even  with  the  most  intensive  cultivation.  It 
is  a cultivation  where  every  grain  of  wheat  is 
individually  planted  in  a row  and  tended  like 
an  onion  bed,  harvested  with  sickles  by  hand, 
the  most  intensive  cultivation  imaginable,  to 
obtain  food  enough  for  those  people,  and  then 
it  can  not  be  done.  What  is  the  answer  to 
that?  The  answer  is  not  in  emigration  to 
America.  Even  if  an  appreciable  part  of  the 

600.000  yearly  increase  could  be  transported, 
their  entry  into  America  in  such  numbers 
would  produce  a social  situation  that  would 
be  disastrous.  So  emigration  to  the  North 
American  Continent  we  may  cut  out  of  the 
solution.  But  we  have  got  our  hands  raised; 
we  sit  back  here  occupying  a highly  moral 
attitude  and  we  do  nothing.  We  put  no  money 
into  the  situation,  no  force  of  troops.  We  put 
nothing  into  it  but  criticism,  and  we  say  to 
Japan  our  hand  is  up.  You  must  not  go  into 
China,  or  Siberia.  Keep  your  hands  off  the 
continent  of  Asia.  Then  what  other  alterna- 
tive is  there?  There  is  one  possible, — the  de- 

[10] 


velopment  of  an  industrial  Japan.  She  may 
follow  that  course,  but  she  is  handicapped. 
England  had  great  supplies  of  coal  and  iron, 
and  she  entered  the  world  industrially  when 
she  had  no  competition.  She  had  skilled  me- 
chanics and  trained  herself  into  an  industrial 
organization  that  holds  a large  place  in  the 
markets  of  the  world.  We  have  come  out  with 
our  capacity  for  mass  production  and  are  oc- 
cupying the  markets  that  are  left,  and  even 
driving  England  from  some  she  already  had. 
But  Japan,  with  a population  not  trained  to 
industry,  lacking  raw  material,  having  almost 
no  coal  and  very  little  iron,  will  find  it  diffi- 
cult to  turn  herself  into  an  industrial  nation 
in  competition  with  Great  Britain  and 
America;  and  we  are  going  to  contest  Japan’s 
invasion  of  our  commercial  field.  We  are 
going  to  do  everything  we  can  to  keep  her 
from  successfully  developing. 

Now  there  is  a living  problem,  a problem  of 
tomorrow’s  dinner  for  57,000,000  people,  and 
it  has  to  be  answered  somehow.  We  in 
America  can  not  stay  here  and  say  we  will 
assume  no  responsibility  in  the  East.  It  is 
political  chaos.  Yes,  a third  of  the  world  is 
without  government,  a disappearance  of  law 
and  order,  but  we  say  to  Japan,  you  can’t 
come  here  or  go  there.  I believe  we  have  got 
to  approach  the  subject  more  sympathetically, 
with  more  understanding,  with  some  grasp  of 
facts  as  they  are,  not  as  we  might  wish  them 
to  be.  We  can  not  put  Japan  back  into  the 
shell  of  the  old  hermit  nation.  We  knocked 
at  the  door  and  invited  with  an  insistence  that 
said  you  must  have  commercial  relations. 
We  demanded  that  they  give  commercial  re- 
lationship with  the  world.  They  did.  It  is 
only  during  the  boyhood  of  some  men  here, 
that  this  happened ; that  a feudal  nation,  shut 
in  a hermit’s  cave,  came  out  and  transformed 
herself  into  a constitutional  monarchy  and 
developed  a liberal  democracy,  for  that  is 
what  they  are  today.  Japan  is  a liberal  democ- 
racy which  I believe  has  as  high  a moral  and 
[11] 


spiritual  national  aim  as  you  will  find  in  any 
Western  nation.  There  is  still  a military 
party,  it  is  true,  and  the  military  party  does 
things  that  the  Democracy  of  Japan  thinks 
are  wrong,  but  can  not  quite  control. 

Now,  you  have  got  those  two  forces.  The 
force  of  a fine,  high-spirited  Democracy  be- 
lieving that  Japan  has  a great  destiny  of  serv- 
ice in  the  East,  of  political  leadership  for  the 
East,  a destiny  that  can  he  accomplished  with- 
out selfishness  and  to  the  benefit  of  the  world. 
And  alongside  of  it  but  growing  less  and  less 
in  power  is  this  military  party  trained  in 
Prussianism,  with  two  successful  wars  hack 
of  it,  seeing  the  possibility  of  an  extension  of 
territory  and  feeling  the  pressure  of  expan- 
sion from  within.  But  that  military  party  has 
seen  two  things  in  the  last  few  years  that  have 
changed  its  whole  attitude.  It  has  seen  the 
downfall  of  its  military  idol.  It  knows  that  a 
nation  built  on  military  force  can  not  stand  in 
modern  civilization;  and  it  has  seen  America 
transport  2,000,000  troops  in  a few  months 
across  the  Atlantic  Ocean.  Now  those  are  two 
great  facts,  and  it  left  Japan,  not  only  in  the 
minds  of  the  public  hut  in  the  minds  of  the 
military  party  as  well,  bereft  of  any  hope  of 
great  territorial  conquest  and  extension  of 
political  power  by  force. ' 

This  realization  has  come  quite  recently,  it 
is  true,  but  I am  confident  the  military  party 
of  Japan  is  in  decline.  That  does  not  say  that 
it  may  not  do  something  tomorrow  that  might 
upset  the  East.  That  is  possible.  But  I be- 
lieve if  we  can  go  on  a few  years  longer  the 
democratic  party  will  be  wholly  in  control  of 
the  situation.  The  franchise  is  being  rapidly 
extended.  While  we  were  in  Japan  there  was 
a national  election  and  the  franchise  had  been 
more  than  doubled  over  that  of  any  previous 
election.  There  has  been  a requirement  that 
a tax  of  ten  yen  must  be  paid  by  an  individual 
before  he  can  vote.  The  Government  has  re- 
duced that  to  three  yen.  Universal  suffrage 
was  one  of  the  principal  questions.  Universal 
suffrage  was  defeated,  and  I believe  wisely; 

[12] 


I don’t  believe  Japan  is  ready  for  the  com- 
plete extension  of  the  franchise.  Indeed,  I 
don’t  believe  that  there  is  in  the  mere  word 
‘ ‘ Democracy  ’ ’ a solution  of  many  problems  of 
government.  A people  must  be  ready  and 
trained  to  democracy.  Throughout  Japan 
there  is  a lack  of  such  training  at  present.  If 
we  believe  in  democracy,  however,  in  a democ- 
racy that  in  its  heart  has  the  highest  ideals, 
that  has  aspirations  that  can  be  measured  by 
the  highest  standards  of  the  Western  world, 
then  we  ought  to  be  sympathetic  with  the 
growing  Democracy  of  Japan,  and  we  ought 
to  be  sympathetic  with  this  great  fundamental 
problem  of  how  Japan  is  to  be  fed,  and  sym- 
pathize with  the  general  attitude  of  Japan. 
She  wants  to  be  measured  by  Western  stand- 
ards. She  wants  to  live  up  to  the  highest  of 
Western  thought.  She  hates  to  be  called 
inferior. 

As  a people  I think  the  Japanese  are  the 
most  ambitious  of  any  people  I have  ever  seen. 
There  are  universal  educational  requirements. 
Every  child  in  Japan  has  to  go  to  school. 
Ninety-five  per  cent  of  the  people  are  literate. 
In  every  public  school  a four-year  course  in 
the  English  language  is  a part  of  the  program. 
The  Japanese  are  handicapped,  for  it  is  only 
the  other  day  that  they  came  out  of  feudalism. 
They  are  handicapped  by  the  fact  that  no 
adult  alien  can  learn  to  speak  their  language 
fluently,  a language  written  in  part  in  Chi- 
nese ideographs  and  partly  in  what  they  call 
Kata  Kana, — a sort  of  an  alphabet  of  56  let- 
ters,— a language  that  requires  two  years  more 
of  every  student  than  our  language  requires 
to  get  only  the  tools  of  education.  That  has 
greatly  handicapped  them.  They  are,  more- 
over, handicapped  by  racial  prejudices,  by 
intense  antagonism ; and  they  are  handi- 
capped by  the  record  they  have  made  and  they 
know  it.  They  are  sad  about  the  record  they 
have  made,  but  are  hopeful  about  the  future, 
although  they  don’t  believe  th«  future  is  going 
to  be  free  from  mistakes,  because  there  is  still 

[13] 


a powerful  military  party.  Even  in  an  en- 
lightened Republic  we  find  there  are  currents 
at  times  that  become  potent  and  wrongly  di- 
rected. So  there  will  be  in  Japan.  But  it 
seems  to  me  we  should  be  sympathetic.  We 
should  above  all  be  courteous,  and  courtesy 
will  go  further  in  handling  the  relations  of  the 
United  States  and  the  Japanese  people  than 
anything  else  that  you  can  name — the  courtesy 
that  goes  between  gentlemen — not  the  calling 
of  names,  but  the  approaching  of  a thing  with- 
out any  feeling  at  all  for  the  sensibilities  of 
the  other  side. 

So  to  come  back  to  this  question  we  have 
here.  I would  approach  it  with  more  courtesy. 
You  will  get  further  and  you  will  leave  a 
sweet  and  fine  understanding  in  the  end. 
Even  though  you  do  things  that  are  regarded 
as  harsh,  the  Japanese  will  admit  the  necessity 
of  much  that  you  want  to  do,  and  will  co- 
operate in  doing  it  if  the  right  approach  can 
be  found.  Of  course,  that  approach  is  only 
through  the  Federal  Government. 

A year  ago  I visited  Europe  and  saw  some- 
thing of  the  awful  blow  that  had  been  struck 
civilization,  a blow  that  we  in  America  do  not 
yet  comprehend.  I saw  something  of  the  hor- 
rible loss  to  the  world  that  the  war  brought. 
I have  thought  a little  about  reconstruction. 
How  can  the  world  make  up  something  of  this 
loss  ? That  led  me  to  think  about  an  economic 
reorganization  of  world  affairs.  Here  in  the 
East  is  the  greatest  opportunity  we  have  to 
recover  all  the  losses  of  the  war  and  further 
enrich  civilization,  if  the  East  can  be  prop- 
erly organized.  We  can  not  do  it  unless  we 
review  the  questions  in  a large  way,  unless  we 
see  that  our  best  interests  are  parallel  with  the 
best  interests  of  our  national  neighbors.  We 
have  grown  up  viewing  foreign  trade,  for  ex- 
ample, with  one  blind  eye.  We  just  wanted 
to  sell  things  and  thought  nothing  of  buying 
things  or  helping  other  people  in  their  indus- 
trial development  so  they  could  pay  for  the 
things  we  had  to  sell.  The  East  is  the  greatest 

[14] 


potential  market  ever  imagined  in  the  history 
of  commerce,  but  the  Far  East,  if  its  labor  is 
not  converted  into  something  to  sell,  or  if  it  is 
without  means  of  transportation  or  communi- 
cation, can  buy  little  from  us. 

With  good  government,  with  transportation, 
with  means  of  communication  and  a proper 
utilization  of  its  labor,  the  East  will  respond 
and  commerce  develop  beyond  anything  you 
can  dream.  But  if  that  development  is  to  be 
dominated  by  selfish  national  purposes  of 
Western  nations  and  attempts  to  get  particu- 
lar benefits,  it  will  proceed  but  slowly. 

If  we  could  all  get  this  broader  world  atti- 
tude— It  is  no  sacrifice  of  Americanism.  It  is 
only  seeing  Americanism,  with  a clear  eye, 
seeing  that  America  has  the  greatest  oppor- 
tunity offered  to  a people  in  a\l  time.  It  is  a 
responsibility  that  should  arouse  the  enthu- 
siasm of  every  American ; it  is  an  opportunity 
for  service.  If  we  can,  as  a nation,  imbue  our 
government  with  a feeling  that  the  attitude  of 
helpfulness,  of  real  service  to  other  people, 
will  bring  to  us  the  greatest  possible  reward, 
our  contribution  to  this  Par  Eastern  question 
will  be  great.  We  can  not  make  it  with  un- 
formed, destructive  criticism,  even  where  criti- 
cism is  deserved.  We  have  got  to  offer  some- 
thing besides  criticism.  We  have  got  to  offer 
our  contribution  of  real  interest,  of  under- 
standing, of  unselfishness.  More  of  you  should 
go  to  Japan  and  the  Par  East.  Go  open- 
minded.  Study  with  a spirit  of  world-wide 
citizenship,  a world-wide  citizenship  that 
makes  you  better  Americans  and  brings  that 
spirit  to  the  development  of  the  East.  It  is 
no  time  for  selfishness.  It  is  time  for  a broader 
comprehension  than  America  has  ever  had  of 
the  world’s  problems — for  a wiser  treatment 
of  our  national  relationships  than  our  State 
Department  has  been  giving  us. 

I think  that  is  the  message  that  I have 
brought  back,  a message  that  would  aim  to 
wake  people  up  to  the  importance  of  the  op- 
portunity, to  the  importance  of  the  obligation, 
to  the  great  service  that  we  can  render  to 
civilization  through  becoming  broader  citizens 
and  coming  to  realize  and  understand  some  of 
the  problems  of  the  East. 

[15] 


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